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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN GIANT 
TIRE SERVICE, INC., 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
BRAD RAGAN, INC . , 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 1555 3 
This is an action by Rocky Mountain Giant Tire Service 
to recover for tires sold to Brad Ragan, Inco 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried to the Honorable James S. Sawaya, 
District Judge, and judgment was entered for plaintiff for 
the sum of $5,575.00 plus costs and interest. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment entered in 
the lower court 0 
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I 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is a case where the testimony of the respondent's 
witness differed sharply with the testimony of appellant's 
two witnesses. Appellant's Statement of Facts sets forth the 
version of the transaction favorable to it and virtually ignon 
the facts favorable to respondent's position and the facts 
supporting the trial court's judgment. 
Ralph Albertson, an employee of Rocky Mountain Giant 
Tire Service, and Arlo Murkin, an employee of Brad Ragan, 
entered into an oral agreement wherein Brad Ragan agreed to 
purchase from Rocky Mountain certain tires which had been used 
and discarded by Kennett Copper Corporation. Mr. Albertson ana 
Mr. Murkin traveled to the Kennecott Mine in Salt Lake City and 
inspected the tires which Mr. Albertson had previously selectec 
(R. 101, 115-116, 127). The price and freight rate were agreed 
on by both parties (R. 127). Mr. Murkin testified that the sale 
was subject to additional inspection in Arizona (R. 127-128), 
while Mr. Albertson testified that the sale was "as is," with 
the exception of eleven tires which will be discussed below 
(R. 116). 
Seven shipments totaling 70 tires were made to Brad Raga: 
2 
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and billed by invoices dated September 16 through November 6, 
1975 for a total purchase price of $15,100.00 (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 1, R. 101-102). Brad Ragan made three payments on 
the tires totaling $7,525.00 (Plaintiff's Exhibits 3, 4 and 5, 
R. 104-105). In addition, Rocky Mountain gave Brad Ragan 
credit for eleven tires (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, R. 98). Thus, 
the total purchase price less payments and credit was the 
$5,575.00, which the court awarded to the respondent. 
Mr. Albertson testified that he had been in the tire 
business since 1950 and he had been selling these tires to re-
capping shops on an "as is" basis for ten to fifteen years and 
that other people in the industry were doing business the same 
way (R. 116-117). Brad Ragan attempted to show that industry 
practice was not to buy used tires without making machine in-
spections. However, on cross-examination, appellant's witness, 
Mr. Murkin, admitted that every transaction in the industry was 
different and that there was not really anything that could be 
considered industry practice in the buying of used tires (R. 148). 
On October 14 and 15, 1975, Mr. Albertson was in Tucson, 
Arizona and was told by appellant's employees that they were sat-
isfied with the tires which had been shipped by respondent (R.107). 
3 
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On November 28, 1975, Mr. Albertson was again in Tucson to 
collect for the tires which had been delivered (R. 107-108), 
At this time, Brad Ragan had made two payments on the tires 
as follows: October 24 in the amount of $2,025.00 and 
November 7 in the amount of $2,375.00 (Plaintiff's Exhibits 
3 and 4). These payments are for the identical amounts of 
the first two invoices for the first two shipments to Brad 
Ragan. 
The background on the credit memo for eleven tires was 
established in response to the questions of the court to 
Mr. Albertson. Mr. Albertson stated that when he and Mr. 
Murkin were looking at the tires, there were eleven tires 
which were marginal but which Mr. Murkin said he might be 
able to do something with because of the type of shop he had 
in Tucson. The tires were then shipped on the chance that they 
would be usable but when it was discovered they were too far 
gone, a credit memo was issued (R. 124). These eleven tires 
were shipped on November 6, 1975 and the respondent was in-
formed by a telephone call on November 10, 1975 that the tires 
were not usable, and tre credit memo issued (Plaintiff's Ex-
hibits 1 and 2, R, 124). 
4 
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POINT I 
THE PREVAILING PARTI IN THE TRIAL COURT IS ENTITLED ON APPEAL 
TO ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES TO BE DRAWN FROM THE EVIDENCE 
IN THE LIGHT FAVORABLE TO THE JUDGMENT. 
The appellant properly points out and the trial court 
correctly identified the central issue in this law suit was 
whether the tires were sold "as is" or subject to inspection 
(R. 177). Appellant claims the trial court findings are in-
consistent or incomplete because an express finding on whether 
the contract was conditional was not made and because credit 
for eleven unusable tires was given. These findings are 
clearly consistent with the evidence and clearly demonstrate 
what the court found. 
For the appellant to argue that the findings are fatally 
incomplete is to ask the Court to ignore the well-established 
rule of review. This standard is set forth in Olsen vs. Park 
Daughters Investment Company, 29 Utah 2d 421, 511 P.2d 145 
(1973), as follows: 
"Further, the trial court having refused 
to be so persuaded, this court on appeal 
would not upset his findings and judgment, 
and order findings and judgment to the 
contrary, unless the evidence were such 
that all reasonable minds must necessarily 
so find; and in making that determination, 
5 
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we review the evidence and all reasonable 
inferences fairly to be drawn therefrom in 
the light favorable to his findings and 
judgment." 
This standard of review is especially appropriate in 
this case. The trial judge observed the witnesses and was in 
a position to judge their credibility. The witnesses told 
markedly different versions of how the transactions developed 
and the court's findings and judgment clearly demonstrate that 
the court accepted the respondent's version. The trial court 
entered a judgment for the total purchase price of all tires 
shipped, less the three payments by appellant and the credit 
for the eleven tires. This is what the respondent's invoices 
show and what the respondent's testimony demonstrated 
(Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 to 5, R. 98-105, 124). 
The only reasonable inference to be drawn from this evi· 
dence is that appellant was obligated to pay for all tires 
regardless of their recap ability, i.e., the agreement was not' 
conditional. The credit invoice for the eleven tires was the 
subject of a separate agreement in accordance with Mr. Albertsc: 
testimony (R. 124). 
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POINT II 
THERE IS A REASONABLE BASIS IN THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Honorable Court has consistently held that where 
there is "any reasonable basis" in the evidence to support 
the findings of the trial court, the findings will not be 
overturned. In Holman vs. Sorenson, 556 P.2d 499 (Utah 1976), 
Justice Ellett said: 
"The policy of this Court has been, 
after reviewing the record, not to 
disturb the trial court's findings if 
there is a reasonable basis in evidence 
to support it. Appellants carry out 
the burden of showing from the record 
that the lower court erred." 
Also, see First Western Fidelity vs. Gibbons & Reed Co., 27 
Utah 2d 1, 492 P.2d 132 (1971). 
The recent case of Hanover Ltd. vs. Fields, 568 P.2d 751 
(Utah 1977), explains the standard which appellants must meet 
if the trial judge's findings are to be reversed. The Court 
said: 
"In regard to the remaining assertions 
of error, this court is constrained to 
look at the whole of the evidence in 
the light favorable to the trial court's 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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findings, including any fair inferences 
to be drawn from the evidence and all 
of the circumstances shown. The trial 
court's findings shall not be disturbed 
unless the evidence is such that all rea-
sonable minds would be persuaded to the 
contrary." 
When the parties to an action each produce evidence 
supporting its action, this Court has consistently refused 
to reverse the trial court unless the evidence is so con-
vincing that reasonable men could not differ as to the results 
which the evidence dictated. For example, in Koesling vs. 
Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975), this Court upheld the 
trial court's determination and made these cormnents: 
"Plaintiff produced evidence tending to 
prove the existence of a partnership. 
Defendant produced opposing evidence and 
further produced evidence which tended 
to prove a joint venture of the nature 
heretofore described. The trial court, 
exercising its prerogative as a trier of 
fact in a nonjury case, weighed the credi-
bility of the witnesses and was not 
persuaded by plaintiff's evidence. This 
court will not disturb such a determination 
when reasonable men could differ as to the 
weight to be given to conflicting evidence." 
Thus, it is clear that the trial court will not be over· 
turned if there is any reasonable basis in the evidence to 
support the findings. At the same time, the appellant must 
8 
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.. 
show that "all reasonable minds would be persuaded to the 
contrary" before the lower court can be reversed. 
THE EVIDENCE 
There is clearly a reasonable basis in the evidence to 
support the findings of the trial court. Respondent's 
employee, Ralph Albertson, testified that he had been selling 
used tires on an "as is" basis for ten to fifteen years 
(R. 116-117). On cross-examination, appellant's witness, 
Arlo Murkin, admitted buying practices vary widely in the used 
tire business. Mr. Murkin said "Every transaction is differ-
ent. There is no two transactions that are anything that 
would be considered industry practice in buying of used 
tires." (R. 148). The appellant was paying between one hundred 
and two hundred fifty dollars plus freight per used tire and 
would sell the tire for as much as $7,000.00 after it had been 
recapped (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1, R. 129, 148). When 
Mr, Albertson traveled to Tucson on October 14 and 15, he was 
told by appellant's employees that they were satisfied with 
the tires which had been shipped (R. 107). By this date, at 
least twenty-seven of the total of seventy tires had been 
shipped to Tucson. It is reasonable to conclude that when a 
9 
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$200.00 used tire can be recapped and sold for $7,000.00, the 
purchaser would be willing to make this small investment on 
the tire on an "as is" bas is and take the chance that some of 
the tires would not be usable. This is a simple economic de-
cision that is made daily by businesses which purchase products 
"as is." Appellant claimed that fifty per cent of the tires 
were not usable, but at the same time, Mr. Murkin admitted 
that nothing was said to Mr. Albertson about rejected tires 
during the October 14 and 15 visit (R. 146). 
On September 16, 1975, appellant was invoiced for nine 
tires in the sum of $2,025.00 and the second invoice on 
September 23, 1975 was for ten tires in the sum of $2, 375.00. 
The first payment to respondent was made October 24, 1975 for 
the sum of $2, 025. 00 and the second payment was made November 
7 for the sum of $2,375.00. Thus, after the October 14-15 
meeting in Tucson, it is reasonable to conclude appellant 
paid the first two invoices and made no complaints about the 
quality of the casings. This is consistent with the nature of 
the agreement since appellant had nothing to complaint about 
for tires which were purchased "as is." 
[. 
The credit memo for the eleven tires supports respondent' 
10 
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position. The background on the credit memo was established 
by questions from the court. 
"THE COURT: Mr. Albertson, what gave rise to 
the Credit Memo of November 10th for twenty-
three hundred and seventy-five dollars for 
eleven tires? How did that come about? 
"THE WITNESS: Those were eleven tires that 
were marginal. When we were up here looking 
at these tires, these eleven were marginal, 
didn't know whether they could go or not but 
Mr. Murken told me with his type of a shop 
that he could do more with the tires than most 
anybody else in the same type of business be-
cause he was so diversified now. I said 'Well, 
take these on a chance that they will go,' so 
I billed them out and then come to find out that 
they were too far gone and issued him credit for 
the full amount per tire. 
"THE COURT: How did you become aware that they 
weren't useable? 
"THE WITNESS: He notified me by phone. 
"THE COURT: All right. But as I understand it, 
this was prior to the conversation you had with 
regard to disposing of junk tires? 
"THE WITNESS: Correct." (R. 124) 
These eleven tires were shipped within one or two days 
from the November 6th invoice date and by November 10, the 
appellant had notified Mr. Albertson that the tires were not 
recappable and a credit memo was issued (R. 121). According 
to respondent's invoices, these eleven tires were the last of 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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' "II 
)11 
the seventy tires shipped. The obvious question is why was 
nothing said regarding the other twenty-four tires appellant 
claimed were rejected at the time of the pre-November 10th 
telephone call, or otherwise. The only reasonable answer is 
that appellant knew it had purchased all but the eleven tires 
"as is" and did not have the right to complain. Mr. Murkin 
admitted that all tires were inspected within a few days of 
arrival and that appellant's policy was to notify the shipper 
of any rejected tires (R. 145). At the same time, he admitted 
there was no notice of any rejected tires although the shipment: 1 
were all received over a three-month period prior to the 
November 29th meeting (R.145-146). 
There is considerable discussion in appellant's brief 
about the November 29th visit of Mr. Albertson to Arizona to 
collect money. Mr. Albertson denied seeing any inspection 
sheets for tires at that time (R. 117). Mr. Albertson was 
looking for the balance due based on his invoices (R. 118) · 
There was some discussion about discarding the eleven tires but 
no reference to any other tires being junked (R. 122-123). 
At the time of this meeting, Mr. Albertson was handed a 
copy of defendant's Exhibit 15, but he was not aware of the 
1? 
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---
exact amount owing inasmuch as he did not have his invoices 
with him. However, he did not agree that the amount shown on 
defendant's Exhibit 15 was the amount owing (R. 112, 158-159, 
164-165). A fair reading of the record on Mr. Albertson's testi-
mony regarding the November 29th meeting shows that he was at 
one point confused about the discussion on the amount due and 
the court recognized as much (R. 119, 123). Mr. Murkin did 
admit that he did not have Mr. Albertson sign defendant's 
Exhibit 15, which is what would be expected if any entirely new 
bargain was made at that point (R. 163). The best evidence of 
the fact that Mr. Albertson did not agree to the accounting 
urged by appellant is that on November 30, 1975, a Sunday and 
the day he returned to Salt Lake City, he had prepared a state-
ment showing the full amount due (Plaintiff's Exhibit 6). The 
original of this statement was mailed to appellant and when the 
subsequent payment made on the account is subtracted from the 
balance shown on this statement, the sum of the judgment, 
$5,575.00, is reached. 
Appellant cites the Uniform Commercial Code as though it 
supports its position, when the Code clearly recognizes "as is" 
sales and the specific section relied on by appellant begins 
13 
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"unless otherwise agreed." Sections ?OA-2-316 and 513, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. That is precisely the sit-
uation here. The parties agree that the sale was to be "as is", 
and the trial court so found. 
Appellant would justify its employees' conduct in this 
case by attempting to change the underlying agreement after 
all the tires had been shipped. Except for the eleven tires 
which were part of a separate agreement, as the facts clearly 
indicate, the witnesses all agreed that respondent was never 
notified of rejected tires prior to November 29. At this time,: 
the appellant attempted to avoid paying its just obligation by 
making a separate accounting. Thus, appellant would have this 
Court ignore the entire history of the transaction to the date 
of November 29, and then on the basis of a self-serving account· 
ing, unsigned by respondent, avoid paying for the tires as per 
the agreement. The trial court had the benefit of observing 
the witnesses during their testimony and found that appellant'i 
attempt to avoid payment was not justified. The trial judge 
should be affirmed in so finding. 
POINT III 
INTEREST WAS PROPERLY AWARDED ON THE JUDGMENT. 
'k The trial court found that even after the appellant 5 
I 
14 
... 
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payment on December 19, 1975, there was owing to respondent 
$5,575000. Interest was then awarded from that date to judg-
ment at the legal rate of six per cent per annum and from the 
date of judgment at eight per cent per annum. Interest at 8% 
per annum on the judgment is mandated by Section 15-1-4, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. 
The Utah Supreme Court established the guideline for 
awarding pre-judgment interest in Bingham Coal & Lumber Co. vs. 
Board of Education, 61 Utah 149, 211 P. 981 (1922). The test 
was whether the damages were complete and could be ascertained 
as of a particular time and in accordance with known standards 
of value. Here, the court determined that the additional 
$5,575.00 was due when the last payment was received and was 
therefore justified in awarding the pre-judgment interest at 
the legal rate. 
The fact that the complaint does not specifically pray 
for pre-judgment interest is of little consequence. Rule 54(c), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides " .... every final judgment 
shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is 
rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such 
relief in its pleadings." 
Other jurisdictions have applied similar rules and allowed 
15 
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the awarding of interest even when not specifically sought in 
the complaint. Arizona Title Insurance and Truck Co. vs. 
O'Malley Lumber Co., 14 Ariz. App. 486, 484 P.2d 639 (1971); 
Checker Incorporated vs. Zaman, 467 P.2d 100 (Nev. 1970). 
CONCLUSION 
There is substantial evidence to support the court's find· 
ings and judgment. Certainly, there is a reasonable basis for 
the findings and the clear inference from the specific findingo, 
is that the agreement was unconditional. The weight of the 
evidence favors the trial court's findings and this court shouli 1 
not reverse based on the re-argument of the evidence by appel1< 1 
Only on appeal has the appellant decided that what it wa>, 
arguing for at trial did not even make sense mathematically. 
Accordingly, the trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
BAYLE AND LAUCHNOR 
t c~' a4 ~/*-
F. Robert Bayle } 
16 
Lewis B. Quigle1 ( 
Attorneys for Respondent 
• 
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I hereby certify that three (3) copies of the Brief 
of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid, to Kay M. Lewis, 
Esq. and Lawrence E. Corbridge, Esq. of Jensen & Lewis, 
Attorneys for Appellant, 320 South 300 East Street, Suite 1, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this~-·-··- day of June, 1978. 
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